Many recent papers explore the extent t o w h i c h our understanding of nancial markets is enhanced by a d d i n g a h uman behavioral element. For example, the equity premium puzzle can be better understood with reference to behavioral considerations like \ m yopic risk aversion" of Benartzi and Thaler 1995] (where people tend to weigh losses more heavily than gains) and the \house money e ect" of Barberis, Huang, and Santos 2001] (by w h i c h investors take e x t r a c hances with recently earned high returns). Seemingly irrational actions of individuals managing their portfolios can be better understood by making reference to the human trait of overcon dence, as shown by Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam 1998 ], Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny 1998] , and Odean 1998 ].
In this paper, I explore a behavioral explanation for time-varying returns observed on an intraday basis in the stock m a r k et. Making reference to established results from the psychology literature that link time-of-day to depression and results that link depression with increased risk aversion, I postulate that intraday s t o c k return patterns are impacted by t i m evarying risk premia that are at least partially a function of the variations in marginal traders' moods through the course of the day. T h e h ypothesis is investigated by considering results from previously published empirical studies that make use of intraday data. The results of this study support the behavioral explanation of intraday returns and reveal a previously undocumented feature of the intraday returns pattern, namely that morning returns exceed afternoon returns on average. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, I summarize past ndings on intraday stock patterns. In Section 2, I outline results on depression from the psychology literature and explain the mechanism by w h i c h depression may impact risk premia and hence stock returns. A description of the data appears in Section 3, along with a discussion of the statistical methodology and results. Conclusions are provided in Section 4.
Intraday P atterns: Theory and Evidence
With the widespread availability o f t i c k-by-tick stock market transactions data, researchers have naturally taken it upon themselves to document i n traday patterns in the data and to formulate theoretical models of trading activities through the day. The resulting literature is voluminous. I brie y outline below some of the key empirical ndings and theoretical models.
Volume tends to follow a n i n verted-U pattern across days of the week, with volume lowest on Mondays and Fridays. During the day, v olume tends to be highest at open and close, simultaneous with the largest bid-ask spreads of the day.
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Returns volatility t ypically follows a U-shaped intraday pattern, but it shows no signi cant i n terdaily change. 2 Admati and P eiderer 1988] and Foster and Viswanatha 1990 ] present theoretical market microstructure models for intraday v ariations in volume, return volatility, and trading costs, though neither model attempts to explain the patterns observed in intraday returns. 3 Brock and Kleidon 1992] present a model that predicts the observed patterns in volume and spreads, with a market maker responding to demand surges that arise at market open and close (due to the absence of trading opportunities during market closures), but again, no attempt is made to explain patterns in returns.
Returns are generally thought t o f o l l o w a U-shaped pattern, reaching a high near market open and rising again near market close. 4 The exception occurs on Mondays, when returns are typically low in the morning and negative, on average, for the day. 5 There are few papers that attempt to explain intraday returns. Miller 1989] present models whereby market closures a ect investors' trading policies, leading to U-shaped patterns in returns, returns volatility, a n d v olume which they state are qualitatively similar to those observed empirically. H o wever, the performance of the Slezak and Hong and Wang models depends on the calibration of model parameters, and in neither paper are the models calibrated to actual data. This leaves unresolved the empirical validity of these theoretical models. Given the state of incomplete explanations for the patterns in intraday returns, I explore a behavioral theory for the high morning returns observed in intraday stock returns, and I test whether intraday data reject this theory.
Depression and Intraday Stock Returns
Among Americans, the prevalence of depression is widespread. According to the American Psychiatric Association 1994], as many a s 9 % o f a d u l t w omen and 3% of adult men are su ering from major depression at any g i v en time, and a much larger group is su ering from subclinical depressions (which also cause considerable su ering and which are recognized and treated by mental health professionals). It is estimated that as many as 30 percent of the general population su ers at least one major depression during their lifetime, with a substantial proportion su ering repeated and/or extended depressions.
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Including those su ering from subclinical depression would obviously lead to a much higher gure. Symptoms of depression can include a persistent sad mood, loss of interest or pleasure in activities that were once enjoyed, signi cant c hange in appetite or body weight, di culty sleeping or oversleeping, physical slowing or agitation, loss of energy, feelings of worthlessness or inappropriate guilt, di culty thinking or concentrating, and recurrent thoughts of death or suicide.
A feature of depression is that it uctuates in intensity through the course of the day, a phenomenon known as \diurnal mood variation." The most common pattern in depression is for mood to be at its worst in the morning, 8 perhaps due to cyclical variations in the body's production of hormones like serotonin and melatonin, which w e all face. Another feature of depression is that it has been shown to be linked with a heightened degree of risk aversion, notably, in nancial settings. This relationship has been documented through experimental research in psychology by measuring the degree of risk inclination using a scale of \sensation-seeking" tendencies, which h a ve been extensively shown to reliably measure risk-taking tendencies in the context of nancial decision-making. 9 Depression leads to lowered scores on these measures of propensity for risk-taking { that is, with depression comes an increase in risk aversion. 10 Given the characteristics of depression and given the prevalence of the condition, I postulate that depression may be linked with the pattern of intraday m a r k et returns through its impact on traders' required risk premia.
If a portion of traders experience their worst depression and hence an increased degree of risk aversion in the morning, risk premia and hence overall market returns can be a ected simply by virtue of the fact that market equilibrium occurs at prices where marginal buyers are willing to exchange with marginal sellers. With the resulting change in aggregate demands and supplies for risky assets, equilibrium risk premia can be a ected such that average returns will be higher in the morning relative to later in the day. Speci cally, depressed traders can render pressure on the market early in the morning as they sell stocks to shun risk (leading to prices that are relatively lower than they would be in the absence of a diurnal pattern to depression). This alone may imply higher-than-average returns are realized by i n vestors willing to enter the market over this period. Then as the depressed traders' moods improve, they may resume their risky holdings, placing upward pressure on the stock m a r k et. On balance, the result is higher than normal returns over the course of the morning. Thus, according to this time-varying risk premia theory of intraday s t o c k returns, the highest returns will be tend to be observed in the morning, coincident with the period when some traders experience their worst mood of the day. As the morning advances, returns due to depression can be expected to progressively diminish.
A similar phenomenon is observed by Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi 2000b] in a paper that links the depression associated with Seasonal A ective Disorder (\SAD") to changes in seasonal risk premia in the stock m a r k et. In that paper, it is shown that although only about 10% of the population is a ected by SAD-induced depression, market returns in countries around the world are signi cantly higher following the darkest part of winter, even after controlling for January and tax-loss selling e ects. The downward pressure on markets in the autumn followed by u p ward pressure following winter solstice shown in that paper is analogous to the mechanism behind intraday returns proposed in this paper. In the next section, I consider whether the data support the theory that links depression and intraday returns.
the day, and I make use of techniques which a l l o w m e t o d r a w general conclusions from previously published studies.
Data
In order for results from a study to be considered in my analysis, the published work must provide detailed intraday mean returns based on the stocks in an index (on at least an hourly basis) for each d a y of the trading week. Three papers meet this standard: Smirlock and Starks 1986], Jain and Joh 1988] , and McInish and Wood 1991] . The data used by Smirlock and Starks consist of hourly intraday returns on all the stocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average between January 1, 1963 and December 31, 1983. The Jain and Joh dataset consists of hourly returns on the stocks in the S&P 500 index for the years 1979 to 1983. McInish and Wood use hourly returns on all rms traded on the NYSE for the years 1980 to 1984. 12 The mean hourly returns from all three studies and their associated standard deviations are presented in Table 1 . All three returns series demonstrate a similar pattern for every day of the week except Monday: the mean returns tend to be highest in the morning, they are reduced in magnitude through the middle of the day, and then they rise somewhat at the end of the day. The Tuesday through Friday pattern is re ected in Figure 1 , in which there are three separate sets of points plotted, each set representing an average based on one of the three datasets. The Jain and Joh values are marked with black dots, those from the McInish and Wood dataset are indicated with squares, and diamonds mark the Smirlock and Starks values. Each plotted point represents the mean hourly return averaged across Tuesdays through Fridays { as shown on the vertical axis { for a particular hour of the trading day { as shown on the horizontal axis.
Returns on Mondays follow a pattern distinct from returns on other days of the week, a fact that has been documented in many past studies of daily and intradaily data.
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The distinct nature of average returns on Mondays is re ected in Figure 2 . Whatever factors make Mondays unique seem to over-ride the return generating process that applies to other days of the week. Hence Mondays are excluded from the analysis that follows. In the conclusions I speculate on a behavioral mechanism which m a y be causing the unique pattern of intraday returns observed on Mondays.
Since the psychology literature does not provide a speci c time frame (other than \morn-ing") during which the impact of depression is most pronounced, Table 2 contains results of comparing the means shown in Figure 1 across various parts of the trading day for each o f the datasets. In Panel A of the table are statistics corresponding to the di erence between the mean of the return over the rst hour of the trading day and the mean of the return over the four afternoon hours. The columns of data correspond to Smirlock and Starks 1986] (\S&S"), Jain and Joh 1988] (\J&J"), and McInish and Wood 1991] (\M&W") respectively. For each dataset, the following information is presented: the mean of the rst hour's returns, the mean of the returns over the four afternoon hours, the t-statistic testing the di erence between the two, the p-value associated with the t-statistic, and the adjusted p-value computed for applying the Hochberg 1988] Bonferroni method (as described in the Appendix). The lowest adjusted p-value, indicated in bold, is the Hochberg Bonferroni p-value, re ective of the joint signi cance of the possibly dependent test statistics.
In comparing the mean of the rst hour with that of the afternoon, it is striking that the average return realized over the rst hour of the day is about ten times that realized in the average afternoon hour, re ecting a large, economically signi cant di erence. Virtually the entire day's return comes from this rst hour, on average. In terms of statistical signi cance, note that for all three datasets the t-statistic for the di erence between the means is highly signi cant, with p-values almost indistinguishable from zero, suggesting the mean return over the rst hour of the trading day signi cantly exceeds the mean return over the afternoon hours in each of the datasets. A conservative estimate of the joint signi cance of the test statistics, across all three datasets, is facilitated by use of the lowest of the adjusted p-values (indicated in bold), the Hochberg Bonferroni bound. This adjusted p-value, which is itself very close to zero, is signi cant a t c o n ventional levels, re ecting the strong joint signi cance of the statistics in this case.
In Panel B of the table, the same information is presented for the case of comparing average returns from the rst hour of the trading day to those accumulating over the nal three hours the day (as opposed to all four afternoon hours). Once again, the average return realized over the rst hour is much larger than that of the average afternoon hour (ranging from 26 to 78 times larger). Not surprisingly, the di erence between returns is again signi cant for all three of the datasets with p-values almost indistinguishable from zero. The Hochberg Bonferroni p-value indicated in bold re ects, once again, the joint signi cance of the e ect across all three datasets.
In Panels C and D of the table, the average return over the rst two hours of the day i s compared to that of the last four hours and that of the last three hours of the day, respectively, for each dataset. In all cases, the di erences are signi cant a t c o n ventional testing levels, albeit less strongly so, relative t o P anels A and B. This appears to be a function of negative returns, on average, in the second hour of the trading day. These second hour returns have means that are not statistically less than zero, but averaged along with the rst hour, they do weaken the signi cance of the e ect. Still, mean returns over the rst two hours of the day are at least twice the size of mean returns over the last three hours of the day. F urthermore, the Hochberg Bonferroni bounds shown in bold support the joint signi cance of the statistics across the three datasets in these cases.
Finally, i n P anels E, F, and G, results are presented for comparing the mean return from the rst hour to that of the last hour, comparing the mean return over the rst two hours with that of the last two hours, and comparing the returns from the rst and last halves of the day, respectively. In all of these cases, the earlier returns exceed the later returns, sometimes by more than an order of magnitude. All but one of the individual t-statistics are highly signi cant, and the Hochberg Bonferroni p-values indicate the joint signi cance of the e ect in all cases.
Overall, the results in Table 2 indicate unequivocally that hourly intraday returns do not follow a U-shaped pattern. The analysis clearly establishes that the bulk of the daily return is realized in the morning, consistent with diurnal mood variation (more speci cally, morning depression) leading to time-varying risk premia and intraday returns which are systematically large and positive in the morning and much smaller in the afternoon.
Robustness Check
As previously mentioned, one of the only competing theories for the intraday pattern of stock returns is based on returns realized over the rst few and last trades of the day (which Harris 1986] documents to be largest among the rst and last ten trades of the day). Thus, as a robustness check, I control for the in uence of these trades by deducting the average return realized between the rst and third trades of the day from the rst hour's average return, and by deducting the average returns realized between the second-to-last and last trades of the day from the last hour's average return. Harris 1986] provides the required average transaction returns data for the rst few and last few trades of the day, based on all stocks that traded on the NYSE between December 1, 1981 and January 31, 1983. 14 The net average return for the rst hour ranges from 20 to 290 times the magnitude of the net average return realized over the last three hours of the afternoon. (In the case of the Smirlock a n d Starks 1986] dataset, however, both the net average return of the rst hour and that of the afternoon hours are negative, which i s l i k ely a result of the upward bias of Harris' average transactions data.) For the datasets where these net averages are positive, tests of morning returns exceeding afternoon returns are signi cant at the 2.5% level or better. Employing the Hochberg Bonferroni method for testing the joint signi cance across all three datasets leads to a p-value of 0.01, which is signi cant a t c o n ventional levels. Similarly, strong evidence against the U-shaped pattern in intraday returns is maintained after controlling for the rst few and last trades of the day. T h us, even controlling for the e ect of the rst few and last trades of the day, there remains largely unchanged evidence against U-shaped hourly returns and support for the intraday b e h a vioral theory of time-varying risk premia.
Conclusions
While the proliferation of studies on intraday stock transactions has led to the documentation of various patterns in spreads, volume, returns, and returns volatility, there has been limited theory for the pattern of returns. In this paper, I have presented a behavioral explanation for time-varying intraday risk premia and stock returns. The theory is based on diurnal variation in human depression and risk aversion, a phenomenon with solid grounding in the psychology and psychiatry literatures. Systematic swings in risk premia lead to the highest returns of the day in the morning, when depressed individuals typically experience their worst mood and hence their most heightened degree of risk aversion.
Evidence presented in this paper indicates the end-of-day portion of the so-called Ushaped pattern of returns may be far less prominent than the start-of-day portion, both economically and statistically. This paper has not o ered an explanation for the pattern of returns observed on Mondays, when negative a verage hourly returns are typically observed in the morning and for which daily returns are negative o n a verage. One possibility i s that the return pattern on Mondays may b e l i n k ed to changes in people's weekend sleep patterns relative to their more routine sleep patterns on weekdays. This would be similar to the e ect documented by Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi 2000a] whereby disruptions in sleep patterns caused by d a ylight-saving time changes are followed by Mondays with statistically signi cant (and economically massive) negative s t o c k returns relative to returns following regular weekends.
Overall, the analysis presented in this paper does indicate broad support for intraday returns varying as a function of changes in mood and hence risk premia. There is strong evidence that morning returns are signi cantly greater than returns realized over the rest of the day and that hourly returns follow a pattern that perhaps resembles a reverse-J shape more so than a U-shape. The e ect is observed in datasets spanning several decades, and the e ect is maintained even after removing returns realized closest to market open and close.
Appendix: Bonferroni Bounds
In order to deal with an unknown covariance structure between multiple test statistics, I adopt the method of Bonferroni bounds. The standard Bonferroni correction was developed to avoid over-rejection. In general, if you have m ultiple test statistics and you pick the most signi cant of the lot, you will tend to over-reject the null hypothesis. For instance, if the null hypothesis is true, and you perform two independent tests with a 5% signi cance level, there is a 1 ; 0:95 2 = 9 :75% chance of either or both rejecting. So a pair of 5% tests reject almost 10% of the time when the null is true. The Bonferroni method corrects this by adjusting the signi cance level of the test. The adjusted (conservative) signi cance level is =k where is the desired signi cance level and k is the number of tests. Thus rejection of the null at signi cance is indicated if a particular p-value is less than =k.
In the context of tests that are not independent of each other, for example in making use of datasets from partially overlapping time periods, the standard Bonferroni method is a v ery conservative adjustment that can lead to too few rejections. Legendre and Legendre 1998 ] describe tighter bounds, including a variation by H o c hberg 1988], that provide for better properties { the real size of tests conducted using the Hochberg method is closer to the nominal size relative to the standard Bonferroni method, and it is therefore more likely to lead to the rejection of a false null hypothesis for a given rejection rule. One applies the tighter bound by rst ranking from smallest to largest the set of p-values obtained from the set of tests: p i 2 1 k ] where i is the rank of the p-value and k is the number of tests. 
